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Abstract
The prevalence of memory corruption bugs in the past decades
resulted in numerous defenses, such as stack canaries, con-
trol flow integrity (CFI), and memory safe languages. These
defenses can prevent entire classes of vulnerabilities, and
help increase the security posture of a program. In this paper,
we show that memory corruption defenses can be bypassed
using speculative execution attacks. We study the cases of
stack protectors, CFI, and bounds checks in Go, demonstrat-
ing under which conditions they can be bypassed by a form
of speculative control flow hijack, relying on speculative or
architectural overwrites of control flow data. Information is
leaked by redirecting the speculative control flow of the vic-
tim to a gadget accessing secret data and acting as a side
channel send. We also demonstrate, for the first time, that
this can be achieved by stitching together multiple gadgets,
in a speculative return-oriented programming attack. We dis-
cuss and implement software mitigations, showing moderate
performance impact.
1 Introduction
Memory corruption vulnerabilities have plagued the computer
security field for more than 30 years. Multiple ways of ex-
ploiting memory bugs have surfaced, requiring controls to be
placed at different levels in the software stack: mechanisms
such as stack canaries and control flow integrity have been
designed and deployed as a mitigation in existing software,
while new languages were designed with memory safety to
close this class of bugs in new programs [26, 29].
Meanwhile, a new class of attacks, transient execution
attacks [6], and more specifically speculative execution at-
tacks [5,14,16,17,20,22,25] have been the subject of intense
scrutiny. The ensuing vulnerabilities appear difficult to miti-
gate without considerable performance trade-offs, leading to
the conclusion that speculative execution attacks will remain
a problem for the foreseeable future, and therefore a possibly
fruitful area of research [23].
A natural question to ask is whether the advent of transient
execution attacks has changed the security stance of modern
computing systems against memory corruption attacks: does
the security of memory safety mechanisms, such as stack
smashing protection (SSP), control flow integrity (CFI), and
those embedded in memory safe languages, hold in the post-
spectre threat model?
In this paper, we show that multiple memory safety mecha-
nisms that would otherwise successfully prevent exploitation
of vulnerabilities can be speculatively bypassed to perform
arbitrary memory reads. Because these attacks require a com-
bination of techniques, we show that they do not apply to
all memory safety mechanisms and a careful, case-by-case
analysis is necessary.
At a high level, these attacks work by overwriting, either
architecturally or speculatively, a backwards or forward edge,
followed by the use of speculative code reuse attacks to leak
data. In all cases this overwrite achieves a speculative control
flow hijack, i.e., a redirection of the speculative control flow
to an attacker-chosen arbitrary address. One case of such
an attack is the speculative buffer overflow discovered by
Kiriansky and Waldspurger [14], where a return address is
speculatively overwritten.
We demonstrate that SSP, GCC’s vtable verification (VTV),
and Go’s runtime memory safety checks are all vulnerable. In
particular, we develop an end-to-end proof-of-concept attack
in the case of SSP, where the mitigations against a stack-based
buffer overflow in libpng can be speculatively bypassed to
read arbitrary bytes from the victim program. This attack ad-
ditionally leverages a last level cache (LLC) eviction attack
to extend the speculative execution window, and a specula-
tive return-oriented programming (ROP) attack to achieve a
Flush+Reload side channel by reusing 5 gadgets from the
victim program. Both components of the attack are not spe-
cific to SSP and generalise beyond our selected use case. Our
results show that, while such end-to-end attacks are not trivial
to mount, they still represent a viable attack vector. For this
reason we evaluate countermeasures for each attack scenario,
showing how mitigations can be both effective and viable
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from a performance standpoint.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Demonstration of PoC attacks against SSP-based buffer
overflow mitigations, GCC VTable Verification (VTV)
and against Go’s array bounds checks.
• Demonstration of an LLC eviction attack without knowl-
edge of physical addresses.
• Demonstration of the use of multiple ROP gadgets (and
the necessary condition for such attacks) for exploiting
speculative control flow hijacks.
• Proposals of improved mitigations, withstanding spec-
ulative execution attacks, together with a performance
evaluation.
2 Speculative execution attacks on memory
safety mechanisms
In this section we describe end-to-end speculative execution
attacks on abstracted memory safety mechanisms. We begin
with a high level overview of the various components neces-
sary to perform such an end-to-end attack. We then proceed to
analyse the class of speculative control flow hijacks which is
at the heart of the attack; we refer to this general category of
attacks as SPEculative ARchitectural control flow hijacks, or
SPEAR, and detail them in Section 2.1. Furthermore, we anal-
yse the eviction mechanism in Section 2.2, and the speculative
ROP in Section 2.3.
Figure 1: Overview of speculative attack against memory safety
mechanisms.
Figure 1 shows an overview of the steps required to per-
form an end-to-end attack. The attack has a preparation phase
(steps 1 and 2), where eviction sets (to ensure the existence
of a suitably long speculation window) are identified, mem-
ory used by the side channel is created and initialised, and
ROP gadgets are primed in the instruction cache. The at-
tacker then submits an input to the victim in step 3, crafted to
trigger a violation of a memory safety property. We assume
that traditional exploitation of the violation is prevented by
a suitable memory safety mechanism. However, the attacker
uses a speculative execution attack to bypass the mechanism
by overwriting (architecturally or speculatively) control-flow
data, and obtaining a speculative control flow hijack (step 5).
As a result, the victim is tricked into executing a side-channel
send of attacker-chosen memory in step 6: this is achieved
with the ROP component, which reuses code snippets from
the victim program, appropriately selected and primed in the
initialisation phase. The attacker can then execute the corre-
sponding side-channel receive in step 7. The success rate of
the attack is increased by concurrently executing an eviction
loop to lengthen the speculation window (step 4) by carefully
finding eviction sets for selected data.
2.1 SPEAR attacks
A SPEAR-vulnerable code sequence is a code sequence that
results in a speculative control flow hijack. A speculative
control flow hijack allows an attacker to gain control of the
target program’s speculatively-executed code. This is a pow-
erful primitive: an attacker can follow such an attack with
a speculative ROP sequence to speculatively execute code
sequences that access a secret and send it to the attacker via a
side channel.
Figure 2: Overview of various Speculative control flow hijacking
attacks
Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the various instances in the
SPEAR attack class in the context of different variants of spec-
ulative control flow hijacks. Classic speculative control flow
hijack attacks can be performed through micro-architectural
components such as the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) and Re-
turn Stack Buffer (RSB) [16, 17, 20]. At the same time, the
speculative control flow can also be influenced by instruction
sequences that only affect architectural components, such as
registers or memory: we refer to these as SPEAR attacks. For
instance, executing the call %rbx x86 instruction specula-
tively, when the value of %rbx is available at execution time
will result in speculative execution continuing at the address
in the %rbx register. Therefore, if the %rbx register can be con-
trolled by the attacker, a speculative control flow hijack can
occur. This control by the attacker can either be architectural
or speculative, as we will see next.
Similarly, a push %rbx; ret instruction sequence with the
register value available would also simply continue execu-
tion at the provided address, with no need to predict where
speculative execution continues via the RSB. Hence, SPEAR-
vulnerable code patterns can concern both forward edges (jmp
and call) and backward edges (ret).
The SPEAR categorisation offers us a convenient way to
reason on attacks triggered by a control flow data overwrite.
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The classification covers all attack scenarios studied in this
paper, namely, speculative bypass of memory safety mecha-
nisms; the classification also covers other known attacks, such
as the speculative overwrite of a backward edge [14], and the
speculative bypass of manually-inserted array bounds checks
in C/C++ [8].
2.1.1 Architectural overwrite
The case where an attacker controls the control-flow-
influencing register architecturally, i.e., via the Instruction
Set Architecture (ISA), is closely related to traditional mem-
ory corruption attacks. These attacks can nowadays be miti-
gated by mechanisms such as stack smashing protection (SSP)
and, in general, CFI implementations that check the validity
of control flow metadata before control flow is transferred,
thus detecting and preventing outcomes induced by attacker-
controlled overwrites. SPEAR architectural overwrite attacks
focus on the opportunity that the attacker has to speculatively
bypass the checks introduced by these mitigations.
1 ;Copy of RET Value
2 mov rax ,[rsp]
3 mov [stored_ret], rax
4
5 ;Architectural Overwrite
6 ; (Attacker Controlled)
7 mov rax , [target]
8 mov [rsp], rax
9
10 ;Evict RET Value Copy
11 clflush [stored_ret]
12 lfence
13
14 ;Backward Edge Integrity Check
15 ; (Speculation Trigger)
16 mov rax , [rsp]
17 cmp rax , [stored_ret]
18 jne my_exit
19
20 ;Backward Edge Hijack
21 ret
Listing 1: Architectural backward edge overwrite
We provide in Listing 1 and Listing 2 two snippets of
code that illustrate the forward and backward edge cases for
architectural overwrites. The structure of both cases is sim-
ilar: the original value of the edge (line 3) is preserved in a
safe location, after which, we assume that the architectural
overwrite is performed (line 8) with an attacker-controlled
value (e.g. through a buffer overflow). Afterwards, the pro-
gram executes an integrity check on the forward or backward
edge (line 17) before performing the control flow transfer
(e.g. SSP or CFI check). To increase the success rate of the
attack we try to maximize the speculation window caused by
the integrity check, for instance by causing the eviction of
its reference value – in the snippet, this step is captured by
a clflush instruction (line 11). If the CPU mispredicts the
outcome of the check, it might execute either a ret (backward
Architectural Speculative
Family Fwd Bwd Fwd Bwd
Intel Broadwell 99.5 94.9 99.5 98.7
Intel Skylake 97.6 98.3 98.2 92.1
Intel Coffee Lake 99.8 98.1 99.7 99.4
Intel Kabylake 99.5 95.9 100 99.5
AMD Ryzen 100 100 100 100
Table 1: Success rate (in percentage) for architectural or speculative
overwrites of backward and forward edges performed on various
architectures families
edge) or a call (forward edge) which will transfer the control
towards the attacker-controlled value used in the architectural
overwrite (line 21).
1 ;Copy of Target Value
2 mov rax, [orig_target]
3 mov QWORD[stored_target], rax
4
5 ;Architectural Overwrite
6 ; (Attacker Controlled)
7 mov rax, [hijacked_target]
8 mov QWORD[target], rax
9
10 ;Evict Target Value Copy
11 clflush [stored_target]
12 lfence
13
14 ;Forward Edge Integrity Check
15 ; (Speculation Trigger)
16 mov rax, QWORD[target]
17 cmp rax, QWORD[stored_target]
18 jne my_exit
19
20 ;Forward Edge Hijack
21 call QWORD[target]
Listing 2: Architectural forward edge overwrite
We follow the methodology of Mambretti et al. [21] and
test the snippet using the Speculator tool [9], which aids the
detection of speculative control flow transfers by using per-
formance monitor counters (PMC) and speculation markers.
Results show that on every CPU tested, control flow is indeed
speculatively transferred to the overwritten location, thereby
bypassing the checks during speculative execution. As shown
in Table 1, speculative control flow hijacks are observed at
least 95% of the time for Listing 1 and 97% of the time
for Listing 2 on all tested architectures. We thus conclude
that SPEAR attacks with architectural overwrites can result
in speculative control flow hijacks. In Section 3.1 and Sec-
tion 3.2, we further analyze SPEAR architectural overwrites
of backwards edges (for stack canaries) and forward edges
(for CFI).
2.1.2 Speculative overwrite
Alternatively, the attacker may control the control-flow-
influencing register speculatively. This means that in a first
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phase, speculative execution is triggered (for example by a
conditional branch). In a second phase, the attacker specula-
tively influences the control flow edge, thus hijacking specula-
tive control flow. The control-flow-influencing value may be
the result of a load from an address that is generated during
the speculative execution phase, or it may be loaded from a
location that is speculatively overwritten by a preceding store
operation, resulting in speculative store-to-load forwarding.
We provide in Listing 3 and Listing 4 the two snippets of
code that illustrate the backward and forward edge cases for
speculative overwrites. Both cases share the same structure.
First speculative execution is triggered by a condition (line 2).
Then, the speculative overwrite is performed through some
instruction within the speculated part of the code. Here, the
value used for the overwrite is under the control of the attacker
(line 7). Finally, the overwritten value is used for control flow
transfer allowing the attacker to hijack the speculative control
flow (line 10).
Similarly to the architectural overwrite case, experiment
results in Table 1 show that for the backward edge case the
success rate is at least 92% while it is at least 98% for the
forward edge case: speculative overwrites are feasible and
lead to speculative control flow hijack provided that a suffi-
ciently large speculation window exist during which the edge
is overwritten, and later dereferenced.
1 ;Speculative execution trigger
2 ...
3
4 ;Speculative Overwrite
5 ; (Attacker Controlled)
6 mov rax , QWORD[target]
7 mov QWORD[rsp], rax
8
9 ;Backward Edge Hijack
10 ret
Listing 3: Speculative backward edge overwrite
1 ;Speculative execution trigger
2 ...
3
4 ;Speculative Overwrite
5 ; (Attacker Controlled)
6 mov rax , [hijacked_target]
7 mov QWORD[target], rax
8
9 ;Forward Edge Hijack
10 call QWORD[target]
Listing 4: Speculative forward edge overwrite
2.2 Speculative window and eviction
We now focus on an important requirement for SPEAR at-
tacks: the existence of a speculation window to permit the
execution of the control flow transfer and the side channel
send operation, a common requirement for all speculative
execution attacks. This requires a speculative execution trig-
ger, i.e., an instruction that causes a wide-enough window
of dependent instructions that are executed but not retired,
awaiting the retirement of the initial instruction. This is usu-
ally achieved when the process accesses uncached data: the
speculative window then corresponds to the time for the ac-
cess to main memory to complete. In Listing 2 for example,
this is achieved by the clflush instruction. To verify this, we
re-run the snippet without clflush in the Speculator tool and
verify that indeed the control flow hijack only takes place
in about one run out of 1000. When it does, the window is
only a couple of instructions wide. We therefore conclude
that without eviction, or other similar approaches to lengthen
the speculative window, SPEAR attacks are unlikely to be
practical.
In all snippets referenced by this section, the speculation
window is artificially lengthened by flushing one of the mem-
ory operands to the compare instruction. This may not be
realistic, as it imposes a strong requirement on the victim
code to include a flush (or comparable) instruction. Instead,
because the last level cache (LLC) is shared and often in-
clusive, the same effect can be accomplished more realisti-
cally by an external attacker thread computing an eviction
set and performing a small number of accesses to addresses
in this set. An LLC eviction set competes for the same LLC
slice and cache set as the target address to be evicted. Exist-
ing techniques for performing such attacks typically assume
knowledge of the targeted physical address, as the LLC is
physically indexed. As a consequence of rowhammer attacks,
this is no longer realistic, as most OSes have removed access
to physical mappings for unprivileged users.
We demonstrate here that such eviction attacks can still be
performed without knowledge of the physical address. To this
end, we perform the eviction in two steps. The first step con-
sists of the identification of an eviction set for a cache line in
a page under the attacker’s control, by following the approach
of Liu et al [19]. The second step consists in releasing this
page to the OS, and executing the victim process such that
it reuses the previously-created page. This permits the reuse
of the eviction set constructed and verified to be working in
the first step. We show details of such a practical attack in
Section 3.1.2 for SSP.
2.3 Speculative ROP
To perform a complete speculative execution attack, the spec-
ulative control flow hijack must be followed by a side channel
send gadget with a secret input. Unfortunately, Spectre v1-
type Flush+Reload side channel send gadgets are known to
be difficult to find [16, 31]. As in classical control flow hi-
jacks [24] however, a speculative code reuse attack can be
performed by concatenating the execution of speculative gad-
gets to construct a Flush+Reload side channel send sequence.
To chain the gadget sequences, we observe that we can con-
veniently make use of a speculative overwrite of backward
edges SPEAR variant, making such attacks very similar to
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existing code reuse attacks. A similar approach and analogy
exists with forward edges for code reuse.
The requirements for performing speculative code reuse
are the following: i) limited number of gadgets can fit into the
speculation window; ii) all code pages where gadgets are used
must be present and mapped in the victim process. The first
requirement is a consequence of the behavior of speculative
execution. Using Speculator, we concluded that the maximum
number of empty gadgets that fit in the largest speculation
window is 20. The second requirement is explained by page
misses causing speculative execution to stop. We show in
Section 3.1.3 that this can be achieved for a practical use case.
3 Case studies
In this section we analyze different case studies where mem-
ory safety mechanisms can be bypassed with SPEAR attacks.
In particular, in Section 3.1 we use a proof-of-concept at-
tack that speculatively bypasses SSP leveraging architectural
overwrites of backward edges. Section 3.2 analyses architec-
tural overwrites of forward edges, targeting two prominent
CFI frameworks, GCC VTV and LLVM CFI. In the case of
the former, we show how the integrity check of the forward
edge can be used to performed a speculative control flow
hijack. For the latter we report the constraints that this type
of implementation presents and detail the conditions under
which the checks may be bypassed. Finally, in Section 3.3 we
demonstrate two types of speculative bounds check bypasses
in the Go language using speculative overwrites of a forward
edge. We show how the attacker may influence the control
flow target through both a load whose address value is at-
tacker controlled and a load of a value that was speculatively
overwritten by the attacker.
Threat model. The general threat model for all attacks in
this paper is a local unprivileged attacker, targeting privileged
processes. The threat model for attacks based on architectural
overwrite of a backward or forward edge assumes a local
attacker able to provoke a memory safety violation, but un-
able to exploit it traditionally due to hardening mechanisms
being in place. In addition, we assume that the victim pro-
gram can either be executed multiple times by the attacker
or that the program automatically restarts, given that each
attack run leaks one byte at a time and likely leads to pro-
gram termination afterwards. Although mitigations against
repeated execution exist, they are not commonly employed
and therefore this threat model remains realistic. For the spec-
ulative overwrite of a forward edge, demonstrated in the Go
use case, the threat model assumes a victim program with a
specific code sequence, and a local attacker able to provide
input that exercises this code sequence. We do not assume
that the attacker is able to inject code in the victim program.
In all cases, we assume the attacker has access to the victim
program code and is able to bypass ASLR, or that ASLR is
not present, as in the case of Go. The goal of the attacker is,
as in all transient execution attacks, to leak secrets from the
target program.
3.1 Attacking Stack Canaries
Stack canaries are one of the earliest mitigations against
buffer overflows [26], and are widely used to this day. Among
the most broadly adopted implementations are LLVM’s and
GCC’s Stack Smashing Protection (SSP) and Microsoft’s /GS.
At a high level, stack canaries work by inserting a value (the
canary) between stack buffers and control-flow influencing
data on the stack, in particular the saved return value. The
integrity of the canary is then checked prior to using the saved
return value. Local stack variables are reordered such that
buffers, likely to be overflowed, reside adjacent to the canary
while code pointers remain further away. This way, contigu-
ous overflows of local stack buffers can be detected by the
integrity check. The chosen canary value is randomly gener-
ated once during process execution start, and stored in a safe
location.
Each compiler performs the instrumentation differently
but in essence the mechanics are identical with respect to
SPEAR attacks; we therefore focus on the example of LLVM
on Linux x86_64. Implementations consist of two distinct in-
strumentation atoms. The instrumentation atoms on our target
system are shown in Listing 5. The first, the prologue SSP
atom, is placed after the function prologue and local variable
allocation, and is responsible for storing the canary value on
the current stack frame. The second, the epilogue SSP atom,
is placed before local variable deallocation and the function
epilogue. It compares for equality between the global and lo-
cal canary values; if the values differ, the __stack_chk_fail
function is called, terminating the program. If the local ca-
nary value was not modified during function execution, the
function returns normally. We show next that this particular
comparison can be the target of a SPEAR attack.
1 func:
2 prologue
3
4 ; Store canary on the stack
5 mov rbx, QWORD[fs:0x28]
6 mov QWORD[stack_canary], rbx
7 ...
8 body
9 ...
10 ; Check for corrupted canary, if yes fail
11 mov rbx, QWORD[stack_canary]
12 xor QWORD[fs:0x28], rbx
13 je exit
14 call __stack_chk_fail
15 exit:
16 epilogue
17 ret
Listing 5: Stack canary check instrumentation
example
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3.1.1 SPEAR attack on LLVM-SSP
The pattern of the SSP instrumentation closely resembles that
of Listing 1. Under our threat model, an attacker with a buffer
overflow against a function protected by SSP can perform a
SPEAR architectural overwrite attack of the return value of
that function. We describe an end-to-end proof of concept of
an attack targeting a version of libpng with a reported buffer
overflow (CVE-2004-0597): the bug is not exploitable in the
traditional way owing to the fact that the function is compiled
with SSP. We show how a speculative adversary can exploit
the SPEAR architectural overwrite to leak arbitrary secrets
from the victim.
The attack proceeds as follows: in the first step, the attacker
overwrites the saved return address of a victim function, e.g.,
through a classical buffer overflow. In the second step, the
attacker leverages a misprediction in the conditional jump of
the canary integrity check, thus transiently executing a return
to the previously overwritten return address. This PHT-based
misprediction can be forced by the attacker in a way similar
to Spectre v1, by executing the canary integrity check with
an intact local canary sufficiently many times. As discussed
in Section 2.2, another requirement is that a sufficiently long
speculation window exist. We achieve this by evicting the
global canary from the LLC, as we show in Section 3.1.2. The
attacker is then able to perform a side-channel send operation
by constructing a speculative ROP chain to access a secret
and perform a side channel send, as we show in Section 3.1.3.
3.1.2 LLC eviction of the global canary
We apply the two-step method described in Section 2.2 for
the eviction of the global canary from LLC, and thus from
all cache levels by the property of inclusiveness of caches
on the target platform. The global canary value is always
stored at a fixed offset in a page: we use this property to find
eviction sets for this particular offset, following the approach
of Liu et al. [19], which works without knowledge of physical
addresses.
The attacker process first identifies a page with a known
eviction set and then unmaps it to be reused by the victim to
store its canary. This is achieved with two processes under
attacker control, as follows. At first, one of them maps a
hugepage and enters a loop in which it brings an eviction set
into cache and waits for feedback from the second attacker
process. The latter in turn probes its own stack canary and
reports back a success as soon as the canary is no longer
cached.
Once the eviction set is identified, the second attacker pro-
cess releases the page hosting its canary by exec’ing the
victim. During exec, the virtual memory of the process is
released, thus pushing frames to the internal kernel freelist.
Then exec creates mappings for the new process. Each sub-
sequent memory access by the victim results in a page fault
which is resolved by popping frames from the internal freelist.
The objective of the attacker at this point is to make sure that
the page for which it holds the eviction set is allocated by
the kernel for the victim to host its canary. The chances of
this happening can be maximised by knowing the memory
layout of the attacker and the victim and the (deterministic)
way in which the kernel releases and allocates pages during
an exec. With this method, we obtain an overall success rate
of 66.6%±0.96 for LLC canary eviction. We report the mean
over 100 runs with 95% confidence level.
3.1.3 Speculative ROP
We now focus on building and using a speculative ROP chain
that accesses a secret and leaks it through a side channel. We
use the Flush+Reload cache side channel initially used by
Kocher et al. [16], although other side channels can be used
similarly [5, 22, 25].
In Section 2.3, we have identified two major constraints on
the attack: i) a limited number of instructions can fit into the
speculation window; and, ii) all code pages where gadgets
are used must be present and mapped with corresponding
TLB entries. In addition to these requirements, we note that
gadget code, as well as any data accessed by gadgets, must
be available in cache during speculative execution. Typically,
this is not an issue in speculative execution attacks because
the attacker can use the first speculative execution attack as a
warm up phase which brings the required data in the cache,
whereas this attack is single shot: the process terminates after
each attempt and this is an additional requirement.
Concerning the first requirement, the Flush+Reload side-
channel send gadget only requires a few instructions: there
are sufficiently short gadgets available, and length is therefore
not an issue in practice. For the second requirement instead,
we create a tool to search for gadgets in code that was recently
accessed by the victim program, for which pages are present
and mapped in the victim process. The tool traces the victim
process and collects all executed shared (library) code pages,
which are then fed into an existing ROP gadget search tool,
ROPgadget [1]. We ran the tool on the victim program and
found 26 mapped code pages within the 4 different modules
used by the victim: libc, libpng, libz and ld. In total, the
tool discovered 2096 gadgets. Finally, to ensure that all gad-
get sequences are in cache, a hyperthread-colocated attacker
performs a ROP chain warm up phase by executing the chain
in close temporal proximity with the SPEAR attack.
1 mov rax, secret
2 shl rax, 8
3 add rax, shared_array
4 mov rax, [rax]
Listing 6: Example of Flush+Reload gadget
We build a 5-gadget ROP chain using the ROP gadgets
found by our gadget search tool. The chain is functionally
equivalent to the Flush+Reload gadget shown in Listing 6.
The chain accesses a target address computed using a secret
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byte value, as in the initial Spectre attacks [16]. Because
Flush+Reload requires shared memory, we choose the target
address to reside in such a shared memory area between at-
tacker and victim, the first 16 readable and executable pages
of the libpthread library. To leak one byte we use an array
size of 256. To avoid prefetching effects during side-channel
receive, we choose the element size to be 256, i.e., four cache
lines. The total array size equals 256 x 256 bytes, 16 pages.
The ROP chain that we find and use in the attack is shown in
Listing 7. By splitting them in small sequences of instructions,
we easily find the required gadgets within the constraints of
the attack. This chain pops the addresses (controlled by the
attacker) of the start of the 16 pages and of the targeted secret
from the stack. Next the secret value is loaded at line 8. The
next speculative gadgets multiply the secret value by 256 and
compute the target address. The last speculative gadget deref-
erences the target address, resulting in a load being issued
during speculative execution. This eventually brings the value
into the cache to be measured by the attacker. The whole
chain therefore allows the attacker to implement a universal
read primitive over the victim process speculatively, using a
Flush+Reload attack and the attacker’s control over the stack.
1 libpng.so.3.1.2.5 : 0x7960
2 pop rdx
3 ret
4 libpng.so.3.1.2.5: 0x7f0a
5 pop rsi
6 ret
7 libpng.so.3.1.2.5 : 0x128ec
8 mov eax, dword ptr [rsi]
9 mov byte ptr [rdi + 6a], al
10 ret
11 libpng.so.3.1.2.5 : 0x9f4b
12 shl rax, 8
13 add rax, rdx
14 ret
15 libpng.so.3.1.2.5 : 0x9fde
16 add eax, dword ptr [rax]
17 add byte ptr [rdi], cl
18 xchg eax, ebp
19 ret
Listing 7: Flush+Reload gadget ROP chain
3.1.4 Attack evaluation and results
In our PoC, we target the libpng 1.2.5 code in Listing 8
which is vulnerable to CVE-2004-0597 [2].
CVE-2004-0597 is a stack buffer overflow which al-
lows the attacker to read length bytes in readbuf. Due
to improper sanitization of length, a read larger than
PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH is allowed in a stack buffer. Our
victim target is a program which receives a .png file and
parses the file using an unpatched libpng 1.2.5. When build-
ing the victim target with stack canaries enabled, the compiler
will instrument png_handle_tRNS with the corresponding pro-
logue and epilogue SSP atoms. As expected, SSP protects
png_handle_tRNS from exploitation by stopping execution
before the function returns. However, using a SPEAR ar-
chitectural overwrite attack, we can perform a speculative
control flow hijack. During the SPEAR attack, the attacker
feeds .png files of the legitimate length to train the pattern
history table. Then, the attacker provides a length larger than
PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH that overwrites the value of the re-
turn address to trigger the speculative ROP attack.
We run the attack on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700K CPU
@ 4.00GHz. The machine runs Ubuntu 16.04.6, kernel ver-
sion 4.15.0. As described in Section 2, the attack has an ini-
tialisation phase where eviction sets are identified, the ROP
sequence is primed and memory used for the side channel is
allocated. Concurrently with the submission of the malicious
payload, the attacker also runs the eviction loop to lengthen
the speculation window by causing the eviction of the stack
canary in the victim.
1 void /* PRIVATE */
2 png_handle_tRNS(png_structp png_ptr ,
png_infop info_ptr , png_uint_32 length)
3 {
4 ...
5 png_byte readbuf[PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH];
6 ...
7 if (png_ptr ->color_type ==
PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) {
8 if (!(png_ptr ->mode & PNG_HAVE_PLTE))
9 {
10 /* Should be an error, but we can cope
with it */
11 png_warning(png_ptr , "Missing PLTE
before tRNS");
12 }
13 ...
14 png_crc_read(png_ptr , readbuf , (
png_size_t)length);
15 png_ptr ->num_trans = (png_uint_16)
length;
16 }
17 ...
18 }
Listing 8: libpng vulnerable snippet related to
CVE-2004-0597
We measure the attack success rate as the number of times
the attacker is able to correctly guess a secret byte from the
victim memory space, per total number of runs. Canary evic-
tion has a significant impact on the attack success rate. We
therefore also show the attack success rate when success-
ful eviction of the stack canary is detectable by the attacker,
which could be achieved through a side channel, depending
on the victim program. In both cases we measure how many
victim secret bytes are leaked per second. We report means
over 100 runs with 95% confidence level. We measure a suc-
cess rate of 7.19%± 0.62 for cases where the global stack
canary is successfully evicted, and of 4.78%±0.41 assuming
the attacker cannot detect a successful eviction of the global
canary, the most generic case. This results in an end-to-end
leakage rate of victim bytes of 0.3 and 0.2 bits per second
respectively.
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3.2 Attacking CFI
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) of forward edges aims to protect
the integrity of code pointers used in indirect calls and jumps.
CFI implementations contain two main parts: instrumenting
all indirect control transfers to check their validity at runtime,
and classifying valid control flow transfers (typically using
static analysis at build time). We analyze here two promi-
nent cases: the GCC Virtual Table Verification (VTV) [27]
mechanism to prevent c++ virtual table corruption, as well as
LLVM-CFI [18], a publicly available, low overhead, forward-
edge CFI implementation. In the GCC VTV, we prove that
a SPEAR attack is possible, while in the LLVM-CFI case
we conclude that eviction-related considerations result in the
speculation window being too short for practical exploitation.
In particular, this case study demonstrates that we cannot
conclude that SPEAR attacks apply equally to all implemen-
tations of memory safety-related defenses, and case-by-case
analysis is necessary.
3.2.1 GCC VTV
In the GCC VTV implementation, for every call to a virtual
function in the program, the compiler inserts a check to make
sure that the pointer used for the indirect call belongs to the
virtual table of the object. Such check is represented by a call
to the function __VLTVerifyVtablePointer implemented in
libvtv.so library. Within this function, the pointer is looked
up from the table; if found, the function simply returns to the
program which will perform the call, otherwise, it gracefully
fails. If an attacker can successfully evict the cache line related
to the variable the pointer is tested against, speculative exe-
cution is triggered during the evaluation of the check. In that
case, the indirect call to the virtual function is speculatively
executed and the code at the corrupted pointer is executed. At
this point, the attacker has performed speculative control flow
hijack and can mount a data exfiltration attack as described in
Section 3.1.
In our proof-of-concept implementation of this attack, we
artificially evict from all cache levels the variable related to
the vtable of the object within the libvtv.so code. Then, we
create a c++ program that defines two different classes each
containing one virtual method. The first class is our target
for the forward edge overwrite. To verify whether speculative
control flow hijack takes place, we instrument the program
to read performance monitor counters and set the speculative
control flow hijack target to contain a speculation marker.
We use the second class to instantiate the object that is later
corrupted.
After object initialization, we perform a vtable pointer over-
write in our victim object making it point to the vtable of the
first class. Finally, we perform the virtual call for the control
flow transfer which is instrumented by GCC VTV with a call
to the integrity check inside the libvtv.so library. During
normal execution, this overwrite is detected by the library
which reports the corruption and prevents the control flow
transfer by terminating the application. With a SPEAR attack
as described here, we verify that control flow hijacking occurs
in 85% of runs, demonstrating that a SPEAR architectural
forward-edge attack is viable against GCC VTV. We note also
that the redirection is performed to a vtable of a completely
unrelated class, a case which should be prevented by VTV.
A real-world attack would additionally require evicting the
compare variable, for example by using the same method as
in Section 3.1.2, as well as a way of achieving a side-channel
send for the attacker, as in Section 3.1.3.
3.2.2 LLVM CFI
The CFI solution implemented in LLVM uses function types
as equivalence classes: an indirect call to a function of a
different type than the one specified by the programmer is
forbidden by the CFI instrumentation. This is achieved by
placing functions of an equivalence class in a jump table,
thereby having as many jump tables (whose addresses are
carefully chosen) as equivalence classes. The instrumentation
for indirect calls then consist in simply checking that the
address of the target fall within the range of the jump table,
and at the right alignment.
This range check can be seen as a check against a compile-
provided constant value, using the address of the provided
target. Both of these components are by design available and
cached while performing this check: evicting the code that
contains the range check would result in speculative execution
stopping, and evicting the address of the target would result
in the iBTB being used for speculative execution. In either
case, a SPEAR attack would fail. The attack may be triggered
without any attempt to artificially extend the speculation win-
dow, but, as demonstrated experimentally in Section 2.2, the
resulting speculation window is rare and short, making such
attacks unlikely to be practical. We conclude that LLVM CFI
is in practice not vulnerable to SPEAR attacks.
3.3 Attacking memory safe languages
Most modern languages are designed to ensure memory safety.
Instrumental to achieving this property are bounds checks
for load and store operations into arrays. In this section we
show how bounds checks may be speculatively bypassed,
allowing the transient execution of out-of-bounds load and
store operations. We show under which conditions this leads
to a SPEAR attack.
We focus in this case study on the popular Go programming
language, runtime and compiler. We present two variants, one
where data that influences a forward control flow edge is
architecturally overwritten and one where a forward edge is
speculatively overwritten. In either case, the attacker is able
to achieve a speculative control flow hijack. We prototype
both variants and show the conditions under which the attack
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succeeds at a rate exceeding 80%.
1 type slice struct {
2 array unsafe.Pointer
3 len int
4 cap int
5 }
Listing 9: Arrays in Go
Before detailing the two attacks, we give a brief introduc-
tion to the way the Go compiler manages arrays and bounds
checks. Arrays in Go are represented in memory as the struct
shown in Listing 9. The address of the contiguous chunk of
virtual memory backing the array is stored in array. The num-
ber of elements that array can hold (and implicitly the size
of the memory chunk since Go is statically typed and the
size of the elements is always known) is stored in cap. The
current number of elements that have been stored in the array
is stored in len.
Whenever an array access is performed in Go, the compiler
will add appropriate bounds checks. This is achieved in the
course of the compiler pass to translate the abstract syntax
tree (AST) into the static single assignment (SSA) intermedi-
ate representation by adding an IsInBounds meta-operation
before every array load or store. IsInBounds takes two argu-
ments, the index of the current access and the length of the
array, and drives a conditional jump either to the basic block
that performs the array access if the index is between zero
and length minus one, or a jump to a function that raises a
panic otherwise.
1 mov rcx, [rip+0xd0121] #<array >
2 cmp [rip+0xd0121], rax #<array+0x8>
3 jbe 486a66 <main.main+0xa6>
4 mov rax, [rcx+rax*8]
Listing 10: Bounds check in Go
IsInBounds is translated by later passes into a sequence
of instructions similar to the one shown in Listing 10. The
snippet shows a load from an array of integers: at first rcx
is loaded with the address of the memory array, a compare
instruction is issued between the index in rax and the ar-
ray length at main.array+8. If the index is negative or not
strictly less than the length, the code jumps to a call to the
runtime.panicindex function. Otherwise the array access is
performed.
The conditional jump generated by the IsInBounds meta-
operation may speculatively execute the wrong jump target
and perform a transient load or store operation out of bounds.
We show two distinct code patterns, one leveraging a load and
one a store, that may lead to speculative control flow hijack.
1 array[index].function()
Listing 11: Load-based speculative control flow
hijack code pattern
3.3.1 Load-based SPEAR speculative attack
The first pattern is shown in Listing 11. It represents an in-
stance of a SPEAR-speculative attack and consists of an inter-
face function call, where the interface is stored into an array
of interfaces array, dereferenced at position index. Note that
the array must be an array of interfaces so that calling the
function is achieved by an indirect call. For the attack to be
successful, we need index to be attacker-controlled and the
attacker must be able to store the value of two pointers in
the memory space of the target process at a known location.
The first condition is met whenever a process accesses an
array using an index that is received as an external input. The
second condition is very commonly met since programs store
user-provided input for processing. Knowledge of the location
of the stored pointers depends on the memory area being used,
and is aided by the deterministic nature of the Go allocator.
1 type iface struct {
2 tab *itab
3 data unsafe.Pointer
4 }
5
6 type itab struct {
7 inter *interfacetype
8 _type *_type
9 hash uint32
10 _ [4]byte
11 fun [1]uintptr
12 }
Listing 12: Structs used by interface calls
Without loss of generality, we describe the case where
function is the first function defined by the interface. Ex-
ploitation proceeds as follows: first, the attacker prepares the
memory structures that are used when an interface call is per-
formed. The structures are shown in Listing 12, and are used
by dereferencing the tab pointer from the iface struct and
then calling into the fun array.
1 0x561000: 0x562000
2 0x561008: 0x0000000000000000
3 ...
4 0x562000: 0x0000000000000000
5 0x562008: 0x0000000000000000
6 0x562010: 0x0000000000000000
7 0x562018: 0x563000
8 ...
9 0x563000: <CFH target here >
Listing 13: Memory layout in preparation for the
exploitation of load-based speculative control flow
hijack
In preparation for exploitation, the attacker ensures that the
memory layout of the target program contains a pattern similar
to that shown in Listing 13. Assuming that the attacker wants
to speculatively redirect the control flow to address 0x563000,
the attacker creates a fake itab structure (in the example at
0x562000) such that the first entry in the fun pointer array
points to the desired target. Then the attacker creates a fake
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iface structure (in the example at 0x561000) such that the tab
pointer points to the aforementioned itab structure. With the
memory thus prepared, the attacker supplies the index into
the array such that the resulting address (the base address
plus index multiplied by the size of an iface structure) equals
the fake iface structure (0x561000 in our example). With the
index thus set the program will call the runtime.panicindex
function; however if the conditional jump of the bounds check
is mispredicted, the dereference and subsequent indirect call
will take place transiently. Note that, contrary to the case stud-
ies in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, the attack is not necessarily
“single shot”: if the program calls recover, the attacker might
be able to execute the vulnerable sequence multiple times.
We prototype the attack to evaluate its effectiveness in a
proof of concept. The proof of concept only aims to establish
the feasibility of the attack: in particular we do not integrate
into an end-to-end attack and refer to Section 3.1.4 for cache
eviction and speculative ROP. The PoC contains the pattern
of Listing 11 called in a loop to train the pattern history table
and ensure that the bounds check conditional jump as strongly
non-taken. The index used to access the array in the loop is in
bounds during the training phase and is then set to the target
index computed as described above in the last iteration.
To verify whether speculative control flow hijack takes
place we instrument the program to read PMCs during
the execution of the loop, and set the speculative control
flow hijack target to contain a speculation marker. The
runtime.panicindex function is modified to read and persist
PMC values for each execution.
This instrumentation permits us to verify that speculative
control flow hijack indeed takes place. The success rate is
influenced by several factors that we review here. The most
relevant factor is the size of the speculation window, which
is influenced by how quickly the correct jump target is deter-
mined. The speculation window is maximised if the variables
used in the compare instruction that drives the jump – espe-
cially the array length – are not present in any of the levels
of the cache. In order to get empirical evidence of this fact
we instrument the program with a clflush instruction right
before the array dereference to ensure that the array length
is not cached. In practice, an attacker may achieve the same
result by performing cache eviction code sequences. However
flushing the cache alone does not ensure a high success rate:
this is because the array length is stored right after the base
address of the array, whose address is loaded into memory as
the first instruction of the dereference sequence. We verify
that if the two memory locations belong to different cache
lines, the speculation window is maximised. Another factor
that influences the success rate is whether the target of the
speculative control flow hijack is already in the instruction
cache. We make sure that this be the case by inserting a call
to the marker function in the warm up phase before the loop.
We report success rates exceeding 80% when the array length
is flushed and is in a separate cache line as the base address
on multiple platforms (Xeon CPU E5-2640, Core i7-8650U,
Core i7-6700K) and different versions of the Go runtime
(1.13.4, 1.12, 1.10.4).
3.3.2 Store-based SPEAR speculative attack
The second pattern is shown in Listing 14.
1 array[index] = value
2 ...
3 interface.function()
Listing 14: Store-based speculative control flow
hijack code pattern
The pattern consists of a store operation of an attacker-
controlled value at an attacker-controlled location into an
array. The elements stored in the array must permit storage of
a pointer. Smaller sizes would permit partial control over the
speculative control flow hijack target. The pattern requires
that the array store be followed by an interface call. The
interface call does not need to be related to the array. It only
needs to be in close proximity of the store operation so that
it may still be speculatively executed. This pattern does not
require any ability to perform preparatory store operations in
the memory space of the target program. The pattern makes
use of store-to-load forwarding, since the store in the array
is used to (speculatively) overwrite a function pointer which
is later (speculatively) loaded and called. This corresponds
to the “speculative overwrite of forward edge” variant of a
SPEAR attack.
The store part of the pattern consists of a speculative ver-
sion of a “write-what-where” condition. It may be exploited
in several ways to hijack the interface call: the most basic
one would be to overwrite the tab pointer in the iface struct
(see Listing 12). However this would either require the at-
tacker to perform a set of preparatory stores identical to those
discussed in Section 3.3.1, or it would restrict the freedom
of the attacker to choose a target out of the existing inter-
face pointers. Another strategy would be for the attacker to
overwrite the fun pointer in the itab structure directly. These
structures are stored in a non-writable virtual memory region.
However, given that the store takes place speculatively, the
attacker is able to bypass the write restrictions and overwrite
the pointer. We therefore chose to prototype this simpler and
more effective variant.
Exploitation proceeds as follows: at first the attacker specu-
latively overwrites the fun pointer in the itab of the interface
that is later dereferenced. This is achieved, as the attacker
controls value and index. The former is set to the address of
the desired speculative control flow hijack target; the latter is
set such that base array and index multiplied by the size of
the array elements add up to the address of the fun pointer
to be overwritten. As in the previous section, with the index
thus set the program will panic; however if the bounds check
is mispredicted, the store-to-load forwarding and subsequent
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indirect call will take place, achieving speculative control flow
hijack.
We prototype the attack to evaluate its effectiveness em-
ploying a similar instrumentation as the previous section, with
PMCs and speculation markers employed to identify success-
ful runs, and a loop to set the predictor state. The success rate
is similarly influenced by ensuring that the variables driving
the conditional branch are not cached, and that the speculative
control flow hijack target is in cache. Under these conditions,
we report success rates exceeding 80% on the same platforms
listed in the previous section.
4 Mitigations
In this section, we implement and analyze serializing-
based (lfence) and masking-based mitigations for SPEAR-
architectural attacks (SSP) and SPEAR-speculative ones (Go).
We show that in both cases that the masking-based solution
results in a low overhead.
4.1 Mitigations for SSP
We investigate two possible mitigations for the SPEAR-
architectural attack against SSP. A serializing instruction such
as lfence can be inserted after loading the canary in the epi-
logue instrumentation, thereby ensuring that the comparison
can only lead to a short enough speculation window. Alter-
natively, the return value can be masked architecturally with
a generated value that is set to 0 when the check fails (the
canary is corrupted), and all ones when it passes, as shown in
Listing 15.
1 mov rax , QWORD[fs:0x28]
2 mov rcx , QWORD[stack_canary]
3 xor rdx, rdx
4 cmp rax, rcx
5 setne dl
6 add rdx, 0xffffffffffffffff
7 and QWORD[rsp + 8], rdx
Listing 15: Masking mitigation sequence; rax
contains global canary value and rcx contains the
stack canary; rsp + 8 points to the return address
We implement both mitigations as compiler passes in
clang+llvm. SSP is architecture specific, thus our solution
is built for x86_64 Linux systems. We run the SSP mit-
igations benchmarking on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700K
CPU @ 4.00GHz. We measure the normalized runtime
of both return address masking and lfence on SPECint
CPU 2006 Figure 3a. The normalized runtime is com-
puted as runtime over the baseline runtime constituted
by execution with SSP Disabled. For reference, we ad-
ditionally plot the normalized runtime for all existing
SSP implementations, SSP Loose (-fstack-protector flag),
SSP Strong (-fstack-protector-strong flag), and SSP All
(-fstack-protector-all flag).
The lfence mitigation shows a high overhead in 9 out of
12 benchmarks, the highest being 100%, in the SSP All case
with xalancbmk. Return address masking incurs a significantly
lower, albeit still significant performance penalty, reaching a
maximum of 13% for the same benchmark.
Based on this evaluation, we find the return address mask-
ing mitigation to be viable and superior to the lfence mit-
igation: the overhead of vanilla SSP (shown in Figure 3b
on SPECint CPU 2006 is at most 9%, in the case of SSP
All on xalancbmk). In addition, we note that most Linux dis-
tributions either use the SSP Loose or SSP Strong options,
both of which incur a low overhead on all SSP benchmarks:
we record a maximum of 2.1% overhead over the SSP Dis-
abled baseline. With return address masking, the maximum
overhead becomes 2.7% over the SSP Disabled baseline. We
conclude that return address masking does not impose a sig-
nificant overhead with the most commonly used SSP compiler
options.
4.2 Mitigations for the Go compiler
We investigate possible mitigations for the SPEAR-
speculative attack on Go. The mitigations consist of two
different compiler passes that ensure that the vulnerability
is no longer exploitable. The first is based on lfence, whereas
the second is based on branchless index masking sequences.
As part of responsible disclosure we have notified the Go
team, who have implemented index masking as an optional
compiler switch. The feature is planned for Go 1.15.
The first mitigation consists of adding an lfence instruction
after the cmp instruction in the sequence that implements the
IsInBounds metaoperation. With reference to Listing 10, the
lfence instruction is inserted after the cmp on line 2. The inser-
tion ensures that all prior instructions have completed, which
means that there will be no misprediction of the branch target
and any out-of-bound access will result in a panic with no
transient execution. The instruction is added explicitly in the
pass that translates the AST into SSA form by defining a new
Lfence meta-operation and adding it after each IsInBounds
operation. We ensure that the operation is neither reordered
nor eliminated.
The second mitigation we investigate entails the addition of
an appropriate masking sequence that ensures that the index
is set to a “safe” value in case of out-of-bounds accesses. The
masking sequence amounts to a no-op in case the access is
in bounds by performing an and operation on the index with
a sign extended −1 mask. If the access is not in bounds, in
our implementation, the masking operation forces an access
of the element at index 0 in the array by performing an and
operation on the index with a 0 mask. We can see the masking
sequence in Listing 16: after the usual cmp and jmp instruc-
tions, length and index and subtracted in order to set the carry
flag. Then, the sbb instruction is used to set a register to −1
in case of an in-bounds access or 0 otherwise. The array is
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(a) SSP with speculative bypass mitigations (b) Vanilla SSP
Figure 3: Overhead computed as normalized runtime over SSP Disabled baseline.
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Figure 4: Empirical CDF of the logarithm of the overhead percent-
age for the considered mitigations. Overhead data is gathered by
running the full set of benchmarks of the go runtime version 1.12.0.
subsequently accessed after performing an and operation on
the index with the mask thus obtained. The pattern might be
further optimised by using the cmp instruction of the bounds
check to set the carry flag. This, however, is not always possi-
ble since the compiler will use a compare instruction with an
immediate whenever possible. The immediate can only be the
second source operand, forcing the direction of the compari-
son instruction. For the sake of simplicity we therefore rely
on an extra subtraction operation. The masking instruction
sequence is added by defining three new meta-operations –
OpMaskStep1, OpMaskStep2 and OpMaskStep3 – which are later
lowered into a sub, sbb and and instruction, respectively.
We measure the overhead of both mitigations by building
the Go runtime version 1.12.0 and running the full benchmark
suite. We run the experiments on a 40-core Xeon E5-2640
machine with 64 GiB of RAM. Figure 4 displays the em-
pirical cumulative distribution function of the overhead of
each of the two mitigation strategies. We can see how the
lfence-based approach incurs a high overhead (143% mean
and 84% median) due to the fact that lfence will terminate
any speculative execution and thus severely curtail the instruc-
tion throughput. On the other hand, the masking approach
shows a much lighter overhead (12% mean and 6% median)
since the instructions involved are simple and do not cause
any memory-related operation.
1 cmp rcx, rdx
2 jae <raise -panic -code>
3 mov rbx, rdx
4 sub rdx, rcx
5 sbb rcx, rcx
6 and rcx, rbx
7 shl rcx, 0x4
8 mov rax, [rax+rcx*1]
Listing 16: Masking mitigation sequence; rdx
contains the index and rcx contains the length of the
array and rax contains the base address of the array
5 Related Work
5.1 Speculative execution attacks
Transient execution attacks can be subdivided into two main
categories: fault-based and speculation-based attacks [6]. The
speculation-based, or Spectre-family, attacks comprise those
leveraging microarchitectural components such as the Pattern
History Table (PHT) for Spectre v1 [16], the Branch Target
Buffer for Spectre v2, the Return Stack Buffer (RSB) for
Ret2Spec [20] and Spectre returns [17]. Both BTB and RSB
attacks are cases of speculative control flow hijacks, i.e., they
provide the ability for an attacker to steer speculative execu-
tion to an arbitrary location. Varied and powerful attacks lever-
aging the BTB for speculative control flow hijacks have been
demonstrated, in combination with port contention-based, in-
struction cache-based, or BTB-based side channels [5, 22]. In
contrast, this paper focuses on SPEAR attacks. Although the
start of speculative execution always requires a speculative
trigger, based on a microarchitectural component, the spec-
ulative control flow hijack step is based on architecturally
visible control-flow influencing instructions in SPEAR at-
tacks. Among the four subtypes of SPEAR attacks, in Spectre
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v1.1 [14], Kiriansky and Waldspurger identify that specula-
tive overwrites can lead to speculative control flow hijacks,
whereas we identify three new types. We also demonstrate
practical use cases on Go memory safety, GCC VTV and
GCC SSP with a full working attack chain.
The idea of chaining speculative gadgets in a way similar
to ROP was suggested shortly after the first publication of
Spectre attacks [10, 16]. While some publications have re-
ferred to the same idea [14, 22], this paper presents the first
demonstrated case of chaining multiple speculative gadgets
to form a cache side-channel send gadget. In addition, this
chaining is performed using a speculative overwrite of the
return address, and not by poisoning the RSB or BTB.
5.2 Mitigations
Since the first speculative execution attacks have been dis-
closed in early 2018, different mitigations have been proposed
to prevent each variant. Some mitigations are introduced at
hardware level meanwhile others are software-based. Many of
these mitigations target Spectre v2 type of attacks, meanwhile
no complete mitigation has been introduced for Spectre v1.
The only available Spectre v1 mitigations are software-
based and consists in either deploying barrier (e.g lfence)
around each sensitive bounds check or, alternatively, masking
the index used for accessing arrays [7, 14, 15, 30].
While lfence is an effective mitigation, it incurs huge per-
formance penalties if widely applied. Static analysis tools
have been proposed to search for sensitive code patterns. One
example is the Linux kernel where vulnerable code is instru-
mented on a case by case basis either through manual audit
or automatic tools (e.g., smatch [3]) detection [4]. The draw-
back of current available tools is that they target Spectre v1
code patterns only and therefore are not useful to detect edges
overwrites.
For Spectre v2 instead, there are software and hardware
mitigations. The software mitigation currently available is
Retpoline [28]. This mitigation targets indirect calls and indi-
rect jumps and prevents them from being speculatively exe-
cuted by trapping speculation within a loop. As in the barrier
cases for Spectre v1, Retpoline requires code modification and
therefore each program has to be recompiled to enforce such
mechanism. While this has been done inside the Linux kernel,
user-space programs have not yet been using this mechanism.
On the hardware side, Intel published three major protec-
tions: i) IBRS [12], which prevents speculation of indirect
branches using target values computed using lower privileged
predictor modes, ii) STIBP [13], which prevents BTB poison-
ing from sibling threads, and iii) IBPB [11], which ensures
that code before a barrier does not influence the behavior of
the code after. IBRS and IBPB are meant to protect higher
privileged code from lower privileged code [22]. The only
mitigation that provides protection within the same privilege
level is STIBP, which is not enabled by default for perfor-
mance reasons.
Finally, Intel announced as part of its Control Flow En-
forcement (CET) extension, the future introduction of a new
mitigation that will constrain the target of near indirect jumps
and calls to only ENDBRANCH instructions. With this mitigation
there is a reduction of possible gadgets where speculative
execution can be redirect to during branch target injection
attacks. In the context of SPEAR, this mitigation applies only
for the forward edge overwrite case and not to the backward
edge.
6 Discussion
Applicability to other use cases. Beyond the highlighted
use-cases, SPEAR attacks may be employed against other
targets. For example, other memory-safe languages may be
targeted with SPEAR attacks to speculatively bypass bounds
checks as we showed for the Go programming language. Pre-
liminary investigation suggests that this is likely to be possi-
ble, since instruction sequences for bounds checks similar to
those detailed in Section 3.3 are also present in Rust and Java
(for JITted blocks). Similarly, heap hardening mechanisms
such as the checks inserted in recent versions of the libc
allocator might also become the target of SPEAR attacks:
they introduce conditional branches which verify properties
of heap pointers (e.g. the value and size) and may terminate
the program before the control flow returns to the application.
A SPEAR attack might speculatively bypass that check, lead-
ing the application to possibly use corrupted pointers as part
of a control flow decision. Theoretically, any security check
that directly or indirectly gates a control flow transfer may
be turned into a speculative control flow hijack attack. How-
ever, as demonstrated in the LLVM CFI case, a case-by-case
analysis is necessary to establish whether SPEAR attacks are
applicable.
General applicability of speculative ROP. The specula-
tive ROP and LLC eviction techniques are demonstrated as
part of the SSP, SPEAR-architectural overwrite of a back-
ward edge, use case. Nevertheless these techniques are gen-
erally applicable for the exploitation of other SPEAR use
cases, with exploitability always depending on the scenario
at hand. For the general forward edge cases, we note that
this requires, as in classical ROP attacks, a technique known
as a stack pivot, which consists in the attacker setting up a
fake return stack somewhere under its control in memory,
and having the first control flow hijack point to an instruc-
tion setting the stack pointer to that address (for instance,
the push rax; pop rsp; ret stack pivot gadget). We have
verified using the Speculator tool that such stack pivots do
work for SPEAR-architectural as well as SPEAR-speculative
attacks.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate variants of speculative control
flow hijacking attacks, called SPEAR, that exploit and bypass
current mitigations against classic memory corruption vul-
nerabilities to leak information from local processes. With
SPEAR, we show that Spectre-like vulnerabilities drastically
increase attack vectors for local attackers. Therefore, they
force not only the creation of new mitigations but also the
re-design of previously deployed protections. In this work, we
present attacks against stack canaries, CFI and memory-safe
languages. We provide proof-of-concepts implementations
against SSP buffer overflow mitigations, GCC VTV and Go’s
runtime. We show the use of multiple ROP gadgets and details
on how to use LLC eviction without knowledge of physical
addresses in the context of SPEAR attacks. Finally, we dis-
cuss how SPEAR attacks can be mitigated and report our
performance results.
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